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Abstract
The effect of demographic change on the labor force and on fiscal revenues is topical in light of
potential pension shortfalls. This paper evaluates the effect of demographic changes between 2010
and 2030 on labor force participation and government budgets in the EU-27. Our analysis involves
the incorporation of population projections, and an explicit modeling of the supply and demand
side of the labor market. Our approach overcomes key shortcomings of most existing studies that
focus only on labor supply when assessing the effects of policy reforms. Ignoring wage reactions
greatly understates the increase in fiscal revenues, suggesting that fiscal strain from demographic
change might be less severe than currently perceived. Beyond, our micro-based approach captures
the impact on fiscal revenues more accurately than previous studies. Finally, as a policy response
to demographic change and worsening fiscal budgets, we simulate the increase in the statutory
retirement age. Our policy simulations confirm that raising the statutory retirement age can
balance fiscal budgets in the long run.
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1 Introduction
Ongoing long-term demographic changes are widely considered a risk to fiscal sustainability in de-
veloped countries. A shrinking labor force, combined with a growing old-age dependency ratio, is
expected to negatively affect tax revenues and raise pension expenditures. This may threaten gov-
ernments’ capacities to fund social welfare systems and the provision of other public goods. As a
consequence, pension systems in virtually all industrialized countries have been subject to recent re-
forms (OECD, 2013). While the expectations of growing pension expenditures have been supported
by a number of studies, the case is less clear-cut for the evolution of fiscal revenues. The inter-linkages
between demographic transitions and labor market outcomes deserve special attention in this context.
If, for example, a shrinking labor force is becoming better educated at the same time (as is projected),
average wages will increase. Additionally, if there is a scarcity of labor, neoclassical economic theory
predicts that wages should increase in order to stimulate labor supply. Future tax revenues may there-
fore increase despite population shrinkage. Hence, it is crucial to account for reactions on both sides
of the labor market when assessing the effects of demographic changes on future fiscal balances. Most
studies, however, do not systematically account for labor supply and demand responses. We study
fiscal sustainability in the EU, combining population projections for 2030 with micro-based elasticities
of labor supply and demand, allowing us to overcome this limitation.
Specifically, this paper outlines the extent of the challenges for public budgets from demographic
changes in a four-step analysis. First, we incorporate two scenarios of projected demographic changes
via a reweighting procedure into micro data sets for the EU-27 countries. In a second step, the
implied wage effects are analyzed by modeling the demand and supply side of the labor market.
Supply elasticities are differentiated by skill, gender and household type for each EU-27 country. On
the demand side, we differentiate own-wage elasticities of demand by country and skill group, drawing
on a meta-analysis approach. Next, the consequences for fiscal budgets are investigated with a tax-
benefit simulation. We capture personal taxes, social insurance contributions, social transfers, public
pensions, and main demography-related public expenditures. Finally, we analyze the impact of an
increase in the statutory retirement age, which is an obvious and widely discussed policy response to
demographic change.
Our approach is micro-driven and accounts for the full heterogeneity in populations and tax-
benefit rules, required to model essential interactions between demographics, labor market behavior
and fiscal systems. Unlike computable general equilibrium (CGE) approaches, the only assumptions we
impose concern the elasticities of labor supply and demand or stem from the demographic projections.
Our findings contribute to a broad academic debate on the consequences of demographic change.
The impact of demographic ageing and decreasing population size on long-term economic growth has
been treated in a number of endogenous growth models (Prettner and Prskawetz, 2010). In these
models, the association between population size and economic growth is ambiguous and subject to
the modeling framework. This literature regularly predicts positive growth effects from population
ageing, as households seek to save more during their working life. This triggers investments and
hence growth. Incorporating social security however may reverse this result, as rising payroll taxes
crowd out private savings (Kotlikoff et al., 2007). Notable studies investigating the fiscal implications
of population ageing in an overlapping generations setting are Fehr (2000) and Bo¨rsch-Supan et al.
(2014). This literature pays particular attention to the pension system when dependency ratios rise,
while treating the tax system in a rather simplistic manner. Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2014) argue that,
while sticking to a pay-as-you-go system, living standards in Europe can be maintained in spite of
population ageing if total employment can be moderately increased. A similar point is made by Ang
and Madsen (2015), who show empirically, using a long-term country panel, that an ageing work
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force is usually more productive. This suggests that the contribution of older workers with tertiary
education to national production can outweigh higher pension and health costs. Finally, Kudrna et al.
(2016) explore the welfare effects from cutting pensions versus raising taxes.
Concerning the fiscal implications of demographic changes, there are a number of studies on the
sustainability of pension systems. Comprehensive projections can be found in Dekkers et al. (2010),
European Commission (2012) and OECD (2013). There is, however, little work dealing with the
impact of population ageing on public revenues. The complexity of existing tax-benefit system calls
for micro-based approaches rather than representative agent models. Decoster et al. (2014) apply age
profiles of taxes and expenditures to a demographic projection for Belgium. Aaberge et al. (2007)
allow for labor supply responses within a micro-macro CGE model of the Norwegian economy. Finally,
de Blander et al. (2013) bring a demographic projection for Flanders to a micro data set through a
reweighting procedure. The present paper shares methodological aspects with each of these studies,
but is more ambitious in allowing for behavioral responses on both sides of the labor markets for a
multitude of countries.
Our approach is further able to capture heterogeneous developments between population sub-
groups. Our treatment of the tax and contribution systems contains far more detail than macro
models generally can. This comes at the cost of ignoring potential general-equilibrium effects — we
return to this limitation in the next section.
Our paper further extends the literature by exploring the scope of effective policy responses.
Surprisingly, despite the relevance of the topic, there are only very few ex-ante studies investigating
the effects of reforms to pension systems.1 Leombruni and Richiardi (2006) set up an agent-based
microsimulation model of labor supply to analyze the evolution of the Italian labor force-, taking into
account demographic projections. Explicitly modeling retirement rules as well as behavior, they simu-
late the effects of an Italian retirement reform from the 2000s on the labor market. Mara and Narazani
(2011) simulate the effects on employment and retirement behavior of a reduction in pension benefits
in combination with targeted income support in Austria. They show that such a reform increases
social welfare as well as the employment of middle-income males (aged 55–60). Another simulation
study by Fehr et al. (2012) investigates the recent increase in the German statutory retirement age
from 65 to 67 years. They show that this rise will postpone effective retirement by about one year and
redistribute towards future cohorts. Yet, the reform is found to be not sufficient to offset the projected
future increase in old-age poverty. None of the studies above deals with reforms of the pension system
in a comparative European perspective, taking into account different country-specific fertility profiles
and pension systems. Comparing the effects of pension system reforms across Europe helps to shed
light on the role that systemic elements of pension policies play in shaping the fiscal budget effects.
Our results show the magnitude of fiscal strain expected from demographic change, revealing a
negative outlook for the majority of countries. Taking into account labor market effects substantially
improves the balance. Increasing the retirement age, as implemented in many countries, further
improves fiscal outcomes, leading to mostly positive outcomes. This is comparable to previous findings
on the country level. For Norway, Aaberge et al. (2007) find a smoothening fiscal impact when
accounting for labor supply adjustments. Decoster et al. (2014) do not model behavioral responses, but
demonstrate a moderate, positive impact of higher elderly employment rates on fiscal sustainability.
Employing a modest economic growth scenario, de Blander et al. (2013) also find that increased
pension claims can be financed through higher tax revenue as a consequence from increasing real
wages.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our approach of modeling demographic
1 In addition there are ex-post studies investigating the effects of pension reforms, see e.g. Cribb et al. (2013); Staubli
and Zweimu¨ller (2013); Manoli and Weber (2012); Vestad (2013).
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change and the labor market in more detail. Section 3 describes our implementation of the retirement
age reform. Section 4 presents results on labor market and fiscal outcomes. Section 5 contains results
on the inter-generational distribution of funding public finances. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Methodology
Microsimulation Models (MSM) have become a standard tool for the ex-ante evaluation of tax-benefit
reforms (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). The basic idea of MSM is to apply different sets of tax
rules to the same sample of households and compare the outcomes across various dimensions such as
inequality and employment. It offers a suitable framework to deal with the questions we pose due
to its ability to account for the full heterogeneity within a given population. This is in contrast to
approaches relying on representative agents, including CGE models. Moreover, the MSM results can
be aggregated to the macro level, while this can be problematic for representative agent models due to
potential biases. In the context of divergent demographic trends across EU countries, a micro-based
approach is particularly useful, as we can account for the fact that the age composition, educational
attainment and household composition are affected differently by demographic change across countries.
In this paper, we make two main advances in MSM that may be valuable for other research and policy
analyses in the future. First, past MSM studies have been focused on modeling labor supply behavior
while being relatively agnostic as far as labor demand feed-back effects were concerned. By introducing
a novel labor supply and labor demand link (explained in Section 2.2), we overcome this shortfall and
add a more realistic (partial) equilibrium notion to MSM. Second, demographic changes are accounted
for by reweighting the micro data, which allows us to not only study labor market adjustments to
policy reforms in current years but also in relatively distant future (see Section 2.1). Our chosen
framework proposes, therefore, a middle ground between micro and macro approaches by making
MSM outcomes more plausible when accounting for labor market effects. At the same time, the
method is parsimonious, straightforward to implement and does not rest on too many assumptions,
avoiding a black box.
The main parameters we employ, apart from assumptions underlying the demographic pro-
jections, are the elasticities of labor supply and demand. Throughout the analysis, we keep these
elasticities constant, even though it is unlikely to be the case in practice. Time-persistent elasticities
imply that responses of supply and demand to relative scarcities in the labor market are not changing
over time. While the mechanics of the labor market might change over time, it is a priori not clear in
which direction they might change and how much variation there could be. For that reason, it seems
more reasonable to proceed with the assumption that there are no substantial changes to labor supply
or demand elasticities in this time period.
2.1 Population Projections
We draw on Huisman et al. (2013) population projections for EU-27 in 2030, which are differentiated
along the dimensions of age, gender, household type and education, separately for each country.
The projections start from assumptions underlying the Eurostat projections, EUROPOP2010, but
allow for additional variation, captured with two scenarios — the tough and the friendly scenario.
The scenarios make different assumptions about international and internal migration, educational
attainment, life expectancy, fertility and GDP growth. Broadly speaking, the tough scenario implies
more severe challenges for European policy makers than the friendly scenario as it assumes lower
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fertility, lower educational attainment, less international migration and a higher life expectancy.2 The
latter scenario is assumed to cause a strong increase in the old-age dependency ratio. In contrast, the
friendly scenario assumes higher net international immigration to Europe which has a positive impact
on the working-age population as well as increasing the level of educational attainment.3
Figure 1: Projected Change in Population and Labor Force from 2010 to 2030
Own calculations based on Huisman et al. (2013). See also Tables 3 and 4 in the Appendix.
We incorporate these projections into our micro data — European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey — by a reweighting procedure. The EU-SILC data are rep-
resentative for the population in each country and contain rich information about socio-demographic
characteristics and incomes of households, serving as input for the tax-benefit calculator (explained
further below). Essentially, we adjust the respective sample weights for each observation proportion-
ally to meet the target size in a given stratum.4 By means of reweighting, we are able to analyze
how the European labor force will change over the course of two decades. Using the implied changes
in the skill and age composition, we get a projection for the future labor force and aggregate labor
supply before wage adjustments. Tables 3 and 4 detail by country how the population and the labor
force can be expected to change in each European country by 2030. Figure 1 contrasts country-wise
changes in labor force, defined as the population between age 15 and 64, and population for both
scenarios. With few exceptions, the labor force is expected to shrink across countries in both the
tough and friendly scenario — on average by 9.2% and 1.0%, respectively. The most drastic decreases
are expected for Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic countries and Germany. Although fertility rates are
kept constant at the 2010 levels in the tough scenario, this assumption cannot be the main driver
2 Huisman et al. (2013) use a cohort component model to project the age and sex distribution while education
projections are based on KC et al. (2010). Comparing their population projections by skill level to those of the
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP), which provides an EU-wide population
projection for 2020, shows that the two are well aligned in terms of head-counts (CEDEFOP, 2012).
3 The recent influx of asylum seekers could not be incorporated. This is partly due to lack of reliable information
on composition and size of the refugee influx. Moreover, there is huge uncertainty with regard to the length of stay in
the host country. According to Hatton (2013), the rate of accepted asylum seekers dropped sharply in the course of the
1990s refugee inflow in the OECD due to tighter asylum policies. The effects on labor force composition in medium to
long run is hence far from certain.
4 For a similar application of sample reweighting in the context in tax-benefit microsimulation for Australia, see Cai
et al. (2006).
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for the stark differences in headcounts between the two scenarios, as most new-born children will not
be in the labor force in 2030. From all the different assumptions between both scenarios, migration
has the most direct impact on the size of the labor force. As Table 5 shows, net migration flows are
projected to be negative for the whole EU in the tough scenario. On the other hand, the friendly
scenario implies a substantial overall annual inflow of 2.7 million migrants in 2030.
Figure 2: Structural Changes in the Work Force Composition
Projected Changes in percentage points between 2010 and 2030. Shares refer to total labor force. Older workers are
defined as 50 years and above. High education is defined as completed tertiary education.
Apart from an overall decrease in size, the European labor force will undergo two major tran-
sitions, namely a shift towards older and higher-skill workers. The share of older workers is projected
to rise in nearly all countries, most notably in the Southern European countries. This development
is accompanied by increasing educational attainment, resulting in significant increases in the share of
high-skilled workers in every country. This holds for both demographic scenarios and is particularly
pronounced in the friendly scenario. In the tough (friendly) scenario, the share of high-skilled rises by
only 0.9 ppt (8.0 ppt) in Germany, while other countries exhibit stronger increases, e. g. 10.7 ppt and
15.8 ppt respectively in Poland. The developments along both dimensions are visualized in Figure 2.
2.2 Labor Market Effects
In most countries, the total amount of hours worked, before accounting for wage adjustments, is
projected to decrease as a result of demographic changes, ceteris paribus (Table 7, columns labeled
D). It is unlikely that major transitions in the number of hours worked, as implied by our projections,
would leave the behavior of labor market participants unaffected. In a neo-classical model of the
labor market, greater scarcity of the production factor (labor) is expected to induce a wage increase
which, in turn, may cause workers to supply more hours of work as potential disposable income rises.
We model these wage adjustments by taking into account labor supply and demand elasticities as
explained below.
Supply Side Elasticities Our estimates of labor supply elasticities stem from the analysis of
Bargain et al. (2014). While the empirical literature on own-wage labor supply elasticities is vast,
Bargain et al. (2014) is the first study to carry out estimations for a multitude of countries relying on
a uniform methodological framework. They apply a flexible discrete choice model where couples are
assumed to maximize a joint utility function over a discrete set of working hour choices. The utility
function is specified to account for fixed costs of work, labor market restrictions within countries or
even states, preference heterogeneity with respect to age, the presence and number of children as well
as unobserved heterogeneity components. We draw on their elasticity estimates, distinguished by sex,
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marital status and skill level.5 As the study covers only 17 EU countries, we use the respective country
group mean (see Table 2) if a particular country is not covered.6
Demand Side Elasticities To capture reactions on the demand side of the labor market, we use
skill-specific demand elasticities from the meta-analysis in Lichter et al. (2015), shown at the bottom
of Table 2. On the basis of empirical findings from 105 studies covering 30 years, the authors run a
meta-regression of the estimated own-wage elasticity of labor demand. This allows them to obtain
mean estimates for a given country, controlling for characteristics of the study, such as the time period
or the estimation methods. We estimate a regression model on their dataset which follows their main
specification (Lichter et al., 2015, p. 101,) but adds an interaction term between skill level and country
group. We then use our specification to predict conditional mean values, setting the time trend to
2030. Due to lack of available empirical studies, the demand elasticities can only be differentiated by
skill level (low-skilled vs others) and country group. The latter may not be too problematic given
the convergence processes among countries in the same geographic region. The meta-study reveals
negative own-wage elasticities of demand which are larger than the supply side elasticities.
Figure 3: Linking Labor Supply and Demand
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The graph illustrates the implied supply and demand shifts with overall decreasing labor supply and demand.
While this is projected to happen in 15 countries in the tough scenario, the opposite may also occur (see
Figure 1).
Labor Market Equilibrium Figure 3 visualizes our approach to combine both market sides to
obtain the new labor market equilibrium. A formal representation is provided in the Appendix. We
build on the approach of linking labor supply and demand in structural labor supply models by Peichl
and Siegloch (2012).7 In line with them, we differentiate supply-side responses by marital status,
5 See the Appendix for more details.
6 The country groups are defined as follows. Continental: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; Nordic: DK, FI, SE; Southern:
CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; Eastern: BG, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SI, SK. Anglo-Saxon: UK, IE.
7 The key difference to Peichl and Siegloch (2012) is the absence of a labor supply shock on the individual level. In our
setting, the initial labor supply shock arises from demographic change. Our approach is more restrictive as it requires
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gender and skill level, leading to twelve distinct labor markets. This ensures a flexible adjustment
process as it incorporates the main sources of heterogeneous labor market behavior. As we project
a shrinking labor force for 18 out of 27 EU countries, even for the optimistic scenario (Figure 1),
starting from the initial equilibrium A, the labor supply curve shifts to the left due to a shrinking
labor force in the future.8 Under constant wages, employment would change by the magnitude of
the labor supply shock (Point B). This is the pure demographic effect. Negative elasticities on the
demand side, however, imply higher wages due to greater scarcity of labor. We additionally take into
account the demand shift that can be expected. As the total population is projected to decrease in the
majority of countries, the aggregate demand for goods and services can be expected to decrease as well
leading to a lower demand for labor. This is represented by a proportional shift of the demand curve,
reflecting the relative population change in the respective country. A lower overall population hence
manifests in a leftward shift of the LD curve. The new labor market equilibrium is hence defined by
the intersection of LS2030 and LD2030 (Point C), featuring (in this example) higher employment and
wages than in Point B.
Figure 4 displays the resulting average wage changes across the EU-27 for both scenarios. On
average, we project wages to grow by 11.5% (12.4%) in the tough (friendly) scenario. It is crucial to
note that, despite an average increase, there are many workers experiencing lower wages. With a few
exceptions, average wage changes in a given country are very similar across demographic scenarios.9
The starkest changes are projected for Germany and Austria. The smallest average wage increases
are projected for Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia.
Our simulated wage changes are moderate given the time horizon of 20 years. Assuming a value
of 1% for the annual productivity growth of labor over the period under consideration, one would end
up with a total increase in labor productivity of 22% from 2010 to 2030.10 Such productivity effects
would add to the implied wage changes. Our labor market model does not explicitly address changing
skill premiums due to technological change. The educational trends in the population projections are
arguably driven to some extent by an anticipated rise in skill premiums, but they are taken exogenous
in our model.
2.3 Tax-Benefit Calculator
Any analysis of the fiscal effects of demographic change necessarily needs to address the full hetero-
geneity of the population of a country, as tax-transfer rules are highly complex and the individual
burden of taxation (or eligibility for transfers) depends on personal and household circumstances.
The requirements for such ex ante analysis are well met by fiscal microsimulation models (see e.g.
O’Donoghue, 2014), which are commonly used in the analysis of public policies (Figari et al., 2015).
Given our cross-national focus and the EU-wide scope of analysis, a natural choice is to use EURO-
MOD, which is the only tax-benefit microsimulation model covering all EU-27 countries (Sutherland
and Figari, 2013).11 EUROMOD enables us to conduct a comparative analysis of tax and benefit
systems consistently in a common framework. It would be interesting to extend the scope of analysis
constant elasticities on both sides of the labor market. This way, the new equilibrium can be obtained analytically and
does not require the iterative procedure of Peichl and Siegloch (2012).
8 Under the assumption of constant elasticities, any supply/demand curve can be fully characterized by the elasticity
and a single observation of hours. This assumption is crucial for this framework. While behavioral responses might
be quite stable over time, this may not hold under substantial wage changes. Specifying supply/demand curves with
non-constant elasticities is of course possible, but the empirical foundation for this assumption would be weak.
9 For an intuition of the wage effects, see Equation 6 in the Appendix. The wage change depends on the changes in
total population and supplied hours, as well as on the elasticities on labor supply and demand.
10 Comparable studies even assume an annual productivity growth rate of 1.5%, e.g. European Commission (2012,
p. 75) and Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2014).
11 The EUROMOD version we employ relies on data prior to the accession of Croatia in 2013. For examples of recent
applications of EUROMOD, see Immervoll et al. (2007), Bargain et al. (2013) and Dolls et al. (2012).
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Figure 4: Average Wage Changes
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Own calculations. Countries are sorted in ascending order by the wage change in the tough scenario.
to further countries facing demographic challenges (e. g. Japan or China). Unfortunately, there are no
harmonized data sets and microsimulation tools available, preventing the production of comparable
results.
EUROMOD calculates household disposable income, based on household characteristics, their
market incomes and a given set of tax-benefit rules. The model covers social insurance contributions
from employees, employers and self-employed, income taxes, other direct taxes as well as cash benefits.
While pension system rules are not replicated in EUROMOD, individual receipts of private and public
pensions, as well as their interactions with tax and benefit rules, are covered by the data. EUROMOD
is mainly based on nationally representative micro-data from the EU-SILC released by Eurostat, or
its national counterparts where available and when they provide more detailed information. We use
version F6.0 of EUROMOD with input datasets based primarily on the SILC 2008 wave.12 The sample
size for each country varies from about 10 thousand individuals for Luxembourg and Cyprus to more
than 50 thousand individuals for Italy and the UK.
We define a concept of Fiscal Balance (FB) as our outcome of interest. FB encompasses the
sum of all personal taxes and social insurance contributions (SIC) paid less cash benefits received,
that are either simulated in EUROMOD or contained in the SILC data. We further subtract public
expenditures that are closely linked to the population structure, i.e. expenditures for health care,
old-age care, child care and education. As these are not provided by EUROMOD, we rely on Eurostat
(2013), that provides respective per capita expenditures by age group and country. This allows us
to impute these expenditures on the personal level.13 This definition of fiscal balance is partial as it
ignores other government expenditure items such as infrastructure or defense, and non-household or
indirect taxes (corporate income tax, VAT). However, it is still an informative indicator to broadly
measure changes in public finances collected or spent in the labor market in this context as it captures
the main revenue items (income taxes, SIC) and expenditures (public pensions, health and education)
12 For France, the 2007 wave is used, for Malta the 2009 wave and for the UK, the Family Resources Survey 2008/09
is used. We uprate all data to the base year 2010 to minimize inconsistencies between data sets.
13 Eurostat (2013) does not provide numbers for RO, BG, CY, MT, LV and LT. Similarly to the behavioral parameters,
we assume in those cases the average age-related pattern of public expenditures as found in the respective country
group. Although expenditure effects for these countries should be treated with caution, this facilitates cross-country
comparability.
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affected by changes in the population structure and by retirement age policies. For the year 2010,
our fiscal concept covers on average around 50% of total government revenues and 61% of total
expenditures.
In order to facilitate the comparison between governments of different size, the total balance
is normalized and shown as the share of total household disposable income in 2010.14 Note that
we assume an unchanged institutional environment. Our setting does not incorporate a commodity
market, hence there are no price effects. All fiscal results can therefore be understood in constant
prices. Equivalently, one could think of policy parameters that are uprated according to the inflation
rate.
3 Modeling Retirement Age Reform
Our policy scenario raises the gender-specific retirement age in each country by 5 years, which roughly
corresponds to the average forecasted increase in the life expectancy in the friendly scenario (see
Huisman et al., 2013, Table 3).15 The statutory retirement age varied notably in 2008 (which is the
reference period for our sample), from 60 in France to 68 for males in Finland — see Table 6 in
the Appendix. Between 2008 and 2015, 21 out of 27 EU countries have implemented a raise in the
statutory retirement age, mostly in the range of two to three years (European Commission, 2015,
pp. 182ff). Our policy scenario hence anticipates some of the measures already undertaken.
The first complication for implementing the reform arises from the fact that average effective
retirement age is usually lower than the statutory retirement age. There are substantial fractions
of the population that retire before they reach the statutory retirement age, for instance due to
health related concerns and/or country-specific regulations that facilitate early retirement. This is
true for current retirement ages across Europe and with all likelihood also be the case after raising
the legal retirement age. As a result, employment rates tend to decrease relatively smoothly around
the statutory retirement age rather than exhibiting a very clear and sharp drop. This means that
we need to predict employment rates under the new policy regime not only for the group of people
affected by the increase of retirement age directly, i.e. those above the current age threshold and below
the new one, but for a wider group of people. In the absence of a structural model determining the
retirement decision (see, e.g. Manoli et al., 2015), we base the employment rate of the target group on
a 5-year younger cohort (taking the three-year moving average to obtain smoother patterns).16 We
apply this approach to four separate groups of people, distinguished by gender and singles/couples
to obtain new employment rates for all age groups older than 40, which is where employment rates
peak in most countries, though the largest changes occur naturally for age groups around the current
statutory retirement age.17
Figure 5 demonstrates our approach, taking male workers in Germany as an example: the solid
lines are observed employment rates by age in the status quo (2010) under the current statutory
retirement age of 65 (indicated by the first dashed vertical line). We basically assume that an increase
in the statutory retirement age from 65 to 70 (under the first reform) shifts the employment curve
to the right (by five years as well), shown with the dashed lines. For example, as the (smoothed)
14 A numerical example for Austria (AT) illustrates this. Here, the baseline fiscal balance amounts to e–11.2 bn and
decreases to e–23.4 bn in the friendly scenario, considering demographic change only. This difference divided by the
total household income in 2010 (e 124.3 bn) is hence –9.82%, which is reported in Table 13.
15 It also addresses the Barcelona target of raising the retirement age gradually by 5 years (European Council, 2002).
We additionally ran a second reform scenario that introduces a universal retirement age of 70. The main conclusions
are not fundamentally different and the results are available upon request.
16 We also rule out decreases in the employment rate by setting the minimum level equal to what is observed currently
for a given cohort.
17 The age variable for Malta is grouped in 5-year intervals, hence, our retirement age related adjustments are also
inevitably cruder in this case.
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Figure 5: Age-specific Employment Rates
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The figure plots current observed (solid line) and predicted post-reform (dashed line) age-specific employment rates for
men in Germany after a shift of the statutory retirement age from 65 to 70.
employment rate of single men at the retirement age of 65 was 0.19, we assume it will also be 0.19 at
a new retirement age of 70. The area between the solid and the dashed line reflects the total increase
in employment.
After deriving target employment rates, we assign a corresponding number of retirees from the
affected age groups back to work. As the exit into retirement before reaching the statutory age is likely
to be non-random, we need to identify individuals with the highest probability to be in employment
under the new retirement rules. We estimate the probability of being in work for all individuals i
between 45 and 75 years using the following probit model:18
Pr(work)i = Φ (α+ βXi + εi) for agei ∈ [45; 75] (1)
The probability of being employed is a function of individual characteristics Xi such as age (a cubic
polynomial), the number of children, disability status, dummies for educational attainment, capital
income, region, marital status as well as employment status and income of the partner.19 Partner’s
status is crucial in couples, as the motivation to continue work might be low in the presence of a
high-earning spouse. We estimate the model for each country separately for male and female workers
(see Table 14 and 15 in the Appendix with the estimation results).
Having obtained the vector of coefficients β, we are able to predict the probability of being
employed for those currently out of work. We then order these potential workers by the employment
probability and, starting with the individuals with the highest probability, assign current retirees back
to work until we meet the projected target employment rate by gender for each cohort. For those
assigned into work, we assume individual labor supply to be equal to the cell-specific (defined by age,
sex and education) mean value in weekly hours. The individual gross hourly wage is obtained from a
regression that relates wages to observable individual characteristics and uses the standard Heckman
18 A similar approach has been used for example by Brewer et al. (2011).
19 Some occupations or industries might bear higher health risks, implying that workers retire earlier. In order to
take this into account, we would need information on pensioners’ previous occupation or industry. Unfortunately, this
information is not available.
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(1979) technique to control for the unobservable factors that influence the selection into work.20
Once we have adjusted relevant labor market characteristics and imputed gross wage for indi-
viduals assigned back to employment, we use EUROMOD to calculate new tax liabilities and benefit
entitlements. Note that we are not able to account for increased old-age pension claims from longer
employment trajectories as public pensions are not simulated in the model, but taken from observed
micro-data.21 The relation between additional time in employment and the individual pension claim
depends on the country-specific pension system. As an example, countries differ in the number of
years in employment on which the pension amount is calculated and how earnings from various points
in time are weighted (OECD, 2013, pp. 124f). Accounting for altered pension claims would require
a dynamic modelling of individual earnings profiles, combined with the full set of institutional rules
of the respective pension system, ideally also capturing interactions with private and occupational
pension schemes. The European Commission (2015, p. 218) demonstrates the heterogeneity in pen-
sion claims if careers become slightly longer. For working two additional years, the change in the
replacement rate (i. e. the ratio of pension entitlements to previous earnings) ranges from 0 to 20
percentage points across EU countries. A similar caveat applies to the treatment of private pensions,
as this would require an explicit modelling of future savings behavior of the labor force.
The above description of deriving the market equilibrium abstracted from any policy reaction
to the projected demographic transitions. Yet, the logic of our supply-demand link can be easily
extended to any additional policy reform. To see how an increase in the retirement age interacts with
our labor market model, return to Figure 3. Starting from the equilibrium with no policy reform, i.e.
point C, an increase in the retirement age will increase labor supply and thus lead to an additional
shift of the labor supply curve to the right. The new equilibrium point yields higher employment and
lower wages compared to C.
4 Labor Market and Fiscal Results
In this section, we present our main simulation results. We focus on two outcomes (i) changes in hours
worked and (ii) the effect of the fiscal balance. For both outcomes, we estimate effects at three different
stages: (a) only taking into account demographic change (stage D), which isolates the external shock
to labor supply for given wages; (b) after the demographic change and wage adjustments effects (stage
DW), which captures interactions between labor demand and supply following initial supply shock;
and (c) after the demographic change and the counterfactual policy reform of a 5-year increase in
the retirement age (stage DRW), taking into account wage reactions. Results for the three different
stages are shown estimated for both the tough and the friendly demographic scenario and for all
countries. For clarity, we report the results by country group, roughly reflecting welfare regimes
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996). Detailed results by country are reported in Tables 7 to 13 in
the Appendix.
The upper panel of Table 1 shows changes in total hours worked. The pure demographic effect
(D) is -7.0% (+3.0%) in the tough (friendly) scenario for the EU-27. This represents the total labor
market effect, capturing both intensive and extensive reactions. Isolating the extensive margin, i. e.,
the change in total employment, reveals similar effects of -7.4% and +2.5% respectively (see Table 8 in
the Appendix). Eastern and Continental Europe are projected to face the largest declines, while total
hours actually rise in both scenarios in the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries. Comparing changes
in hours to changes in the labor force size (-9.2% and -1.0% for the tough and friendly scenarios
respectively) suggests that focusing on head-count overestimates the reduction in effective labor and
20 The estimation results are available upon request.
21 Pension claims might also change due to changed individual earnings (Section 2.2).
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ignores differential labor supply behavior across socio-demographic groups. The change in hours partly
compensates for the reduction in labor force. This suggests that demographic changes will increase
the share of people with a stronger preference for working.
Wage reactions to initial shocks in labor supply, and accounting for demand-side adjustments
at the same time, (columns labeled DW of Table 1) lead to additional negative effects on aggregate
hours on top of what is induced by the demographic changes only. The wage adjustments to the
demographic change do not, therefore, have a stabilizing effect on aggregate employment.22 The
additional decrease in aggregate hours due to wage adjustment is particularly felt in southern European
countries. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the aggregate difference is a sum of positive and
negative trends for the 12 distinct labor market simulations we employ.
As expected, the hours effects from raising the statutory retirement age by 5 years are substan-
tial (columns labeled DRW in Table 1) with the change in aggregate hours going from −8.5% (1.9%)
to −5.5% (16.7%). The largest improvement in hours of work is seen in Continental and Southern Eu-
ropean countries. This suggests that undertaking this reform can counterbalance the decrease in hours
worked from demographic changes even in the tough scenario. There are, however, a few countries
(Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia) where the decline in total hours still exceeds 10% (Table 7).
Table 1: Labor Market and Fiscal Effects by Country Groups
D DW DRW
tough friendly tough friendly tough friendly
Panel A: Hours worked, relative change
Continental -10.0% -2.4% -10.6% -2.5% 4.9% 14.4%
Nordic 1.8% 7.1% 0.3% 6.4% 7.7% 13.8%
Anglo-Saxon 3.1% 9.4% 2.8% 9.5% 14.1% 20.9%
Southern -2.9% 8.1% -6.7% 4.6% 12.6% 25.0%
Eastern -14.5% -2.8% -16.0% -4.1% -3.0% 9.9%
EU-27 Average -7.0% 3.0% -8.5% 1.9% 5.5% 16.7%
EU-27 Labor
Force Change
-9.18% -1.02%
Panel B: Change in Fiscal Balance
Continental -7.9% -8.6% -1.9% -0.8% -0.9% -0.1%
Nordic -4.0% -4.8% 1.5% 8.5% 2.2% 6.8%
Anglo-Saxon -1.9% -2.1% 1.7% 0.0% -0.2% -1.9%
Southern -3.8% -4.5% -2.9% -2.8% 2.4% 2.8%
Eastern -6.8% -5.4% -4.8% -3.7% -2.1% -0.4%
EU-27 Average -5.8% -5.8% -2.6% -1.3% -0.1% 1.2%
D=demographic change only. W indicates scenarios with wage effect. Panel A shows mean percentage changes in
aggregate hours by country group. Results broken down by country are provided in Tables 4 and 7 in the
Appendix. Panel B refer to percentage changes in the fiscal balances, normalized to household disposable income
(Equation 2).
Panel B of Table 1 shows how the changes in total hours translate into fiscal outcomes. The
figures refer to relative differences in the fiscal balance, normalized by the total disposable income in
2010:
∆FB∑
Y disp2010
=
∆SIC + ∆Tax−∆Benefits−∆Other Exp.∑
Y disp2010
(2)
We first quantify the scale of fiscal stress which the demographic change is likely to lead to.
22 Considering the transition in and out of employment only gives a similar, albeit slightly more positive picture.
Average changes amount to -7% and +3.8% respectively.
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Figure 6: Decomposed Balance Changes by Country, Tough Scenario
Note: The figure depicts the percentage change in the components of the normalized fiscal balance (Eq. 2) for each
step, relative to 2010. TAX: Personal Taxes; SIC: Social Insurance Contributions; BEN: Benefit and Pension Payments;
EXP: Demography-related expenditures.
Under constant wages (columns labeled D in Table 1), public fiscal balances would decrease by around
6% of household disposable income in both scenarios. The negative budgetary effect in the friendly
scenario occurs despite hours increasing 3% on average. This suggests a predominant effect from wage
losses for highly qualified workers compared to positive revenue effects from higher wages and hours
worked for other groups of employees. Figures 6 and 7 decompose the change in fiscal balances for
the tough and friendly scenarios. The components include income tax, social security contributions,
cash benefits and government expenditure (including health, old-age care, child care and educational
expenditures as explained in Section 2.3). From these figures, we can see that the negative fiscal
balance estimated before accounting for wage changes or introducing the retirement reform (bars
labelled D in Figures 6 and 7) is driven by increased spending on (old age) cash benefits, partly
counterbalanced by increased taxes and social insurance contributions though not always. The fiscal
outlook is similar across countries, a few exceptions include those which are expected to face significant
population growth (e.g. Sweden) or have a greater reliance on private pension schemes, such as Ireland
or the UK. Another interesting finding is a positive contribution of expenditures in some Eastern
European countries and Germany (tough scenario), which can be explained by large decreases in the
total population.
With wage adjustments, the fiscal outlook is less bleak. The average change in fiscal balance
is still negative but reduced to -3% (-1%) in the tough (friendly) scenario (columns labeled DW in
Table 1). The net budget change in the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries becomes even positive, on
average. The Continental countries also improve their position substantially, while improvements are
less drastic for the Southern and Eastern countries. As can be seen in Figures 6 and 7, improvements
in the fiscal balance from the wage change are mainly due to higher tax revenues (bars labeled DW
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compared to D). Revenues from contributions and spending on benefits vary relatively little. While
the friendly scenario shows fiscal balances in nearly all EU countries close or above zero after the
wage reactions, a couple of countries perform poorly in the tough demographic scenario: Hungary,
Latvia, Romania and Slovakia end up with deficits above 5% of total household disposable income.
A couple of reasons may serve as intuition for these results. Latvia, Romania and Hungary belong
to the countries with the strongest projected decline in labor force and working hours. In the next
simulation step, wage increases are not translated into higher tax revenues. This is presumably due
to the flat tax regimes present in these countries.23
The retirement age reform brings EU average fiscal balance close to break even in both sce-
narios. Compared with the outcome after the demographic and wage changes (columns labeled DRW
compared to DW in Table 1), fiscal balances improve most in the Southern and Eastern Europe, while
we project stagnating or even falling balances for the other country groups. This is explained by the
fact that there are two developments following the retirement age increase. Mechanically, cash benefits
decrease and revenues increase with higher employment among the older cohorts. Additionally, there
is a wage decrease due to higher labor supply, working against the positive revenue effect. The addi-
tional budget change from the retirement age reform is marked by a clear decrease in benefit payments
(bars labeled DRW compared to DW in Figures 6 and 7). This positive effect on balances is offset by
decreases in tax revenues, in some cases even dropping below the level with pure demographic changes
(D). A main reason for such a drop can be found by investigating the employment-age profiles as in
Figure 5.24 The four countries identified above share low employment rates well below the statutory
retirement age. As a consequence, the policy scenario induces little additional employment, thus also
limiting fiscal improvements. This is in contrast to Bulgaria, for which strong demographic shifts
are projected as well. The retirement policy however substantially improves the fiscal position for
Bulgaria, as employment rates are much higher for workers just below the statutory retirement age
than in those countries with little differences between the scenarios DW and DRW.
23 Slovakia reintroduced a progressive income tax in 2012.
24 The figures are available upon request.
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Figure 7: Decomposed Balance Changes by Country, Friendly Scenario
Note: The figure depicts the percentage change in the components of the normalized fiscal balance (Eq. 2) for each
step, relative to 2010. TAX: Personal Taxes; SIC: Social Insurance Contributions; BEN: Benefit and Pension Payments;
EXP: Demography-related expenditures.
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5 Intergenerational Distributional Impact
The previous section demonstrated fiscal strains for most countries from the expected demographic
change. A related question is how the financing of public goods is going to be distributed across the
population in the future. We therefore investigate the consequences of the demographic change on
the intergenerational distribution of financial burden. Governments are financed to a large extent
by the working-age population: the share of total taxes and contributions paid by people aged 15 to
64 amounts to 91% on average for the base year. Our demographic scenarios show that the share
of working-age population, on average, decreases from 67.9% to 63.4% (tough) and 62.3% (friendly)
respectively. Figure 8 plots the change in the share of the working age population between 2010 and
2030 on the horizontal axis, and the change in the share of the taxes and social security paid by the
working-age population on the vertical axis (in the absence of a retirement age reform). Most of the
countries (in both demographic scenarios) appear to the left of the 45-degree line. This means that,
while the share of working-age people in the population is projected to decrease from 68% in average in
2010 to around 63% in 2030, the fiscal burden for this group does not decrease by the same magnitude.
In other words, the working-age population pays a larger share of total tax and social security in 2030
than in 2010, relative to its share in population. The fiscal burden accrues more towards the working
age population than the non-working age population. This result is intuitive on two grounds. First, it
is mainly the working-age population profiting from higher average wages. Second, most income tax
and contribution systems treat pension incomes preferentially (OECD, 2013).
Figure 8: Payment Burden of Working-Age Population
The graph contrasts changes in the payment share of taxes and social security contributions by the working-age
population with its change in population share. The revenue amounts take wage reactions into account (DW).
6 Conclusion
It is widely believed that ageing populations in European countries will put pressure on public finances
through higher spending on old age benefits and lower tax revenues. The issue has gained even more
relevance in the aftermath of the Great Recession which has weakened governments’ fiscal positions
ahead of demographic developments. This paper assesses to what extent these concerns are justified
and explores a raise in the statutory retirement age as one likely policy response.
Linking EU-27 demographic projections for 2030 with rich household-level data and employ-
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ing microsimulation methods, we simulate the fiscal effects of demographic change, accounting for
substantial population heterogeneity and the complexity of tax-benefit systems. Using the EU tax-
benefit model EUROMOD, our analysis covers 27 EU countries in a consistent way in a common
framework. This is complemented by a partial equilibrium model of the labor market, relying on
recent micro-based empirical evidence.
We quantify the scale of fiscal stress which the demographic change is likely to incur. Assuming
constant real wages, public fiscal balances would decrease by around 6% of household disposable
income on average — less than the drastic fiscal adjustments carried out in European countries
following the recent crisis but of a comparable magnitude.25 This is driven by increased spending
on (old age) cash benefits, in most countries partly counterbalanced by increased taxes and social
insurance contributions due to the older and better educated labor force. The fiscal outlook is broadly
similar across countries, a few exceptions include those which are expected to face more favorable
demographic developments and have a greater reliance on private pension schemes. Overall, the
results are not particularly sensitive to the underlying demographic scenarios. Under flexible wage
conditions, however, labor scarcity leads to a strong wage growth and small employment increases
(compared to the situation with fixed wages) which, together, notably reduce the worsening in fiscal
balances though are not sufficient to withstand it entirely.
We also consider a retirement age reform which increases the current (gender-specific) statutory
retirement age by 5 years — roughly corresponding to the projected increase in life expectancy. We
model effective retirement ages by extrapolating current employment profiles. Our results demonstrate
that such reforms could more than offset the impact of demographic processes on fiscal balances. This
is due to increased taxes as there is a strong correlation between the increase in the number of people
in work and improvement in the fiscal balance, though the reduction of the welfare bill also matters.
These effects are, however, moderated and sometimes even reversed, by lower wages due to higher labor
supply. As a result, the likely wage reaction to the demographic change, coupled with a retirement
age reform are sufficient to avoid worsening in fiscal balances in nearly all countries. An analysis of
the change of the fiscal burden reveals that under the existing tax-benefit systems, the working-age
population will assume even a greater role in financing the government. Their share of payments
relative to the population share is projected to rise. Overall, our results paint a less worrying outlook
on the fiscal implications of the demographic change. This is line with previous findings on the country
level.
We conclude that wage dynamics are highly relevant for the analysis as dramatic demographic
shifts may engender important wage adjustments. This highlights the importance of taking inter-
actions between the demand and supply sides of the labor market into account when evaluating
retirement reforms — looking at static effects only can be highly misleading. Nevertheless, our results
should be considered in light of some limitations. Extensions to our work could address broader gen-
eral equilibrium effects by considering the role of technological change and associated changes in labor
productivity and returns to education. A more comprehensive concept of fiscal balance, taking e.g.
indirect taxes into account, could be useful. Applying our setting to a dynamic microsimulation model
could improve accuracy with respect to the change in individual pension entitlements in particular.
Further work can also explore alternative policy options available such as reducing public pensions
and increasing the tax burden for those currently employed. Another option to counterbalance a
decreasing labor force is pursuing policies which encourage higher migration. Even though migrants
are likely to be net fiscal contributors (see e.g. Dustmann et al., 2010), this topic remains politically
highly sensitive.
25 Replicating our fiscal balance concept with revenue statistics, EU-27 balances worsened during the Great Recession,
on average, by 7.4% of disposable income.
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Appendix
Labor supply elasticities
The total supply elasticity for subgroup g ∈ [1, . . . , 12] in country c is defined as a percentage change
in total hours in relation to the percentage change in wages: εSgc =
∂Hgc
∂wgc
wgc
Hgc
. The intensive elasticity is
this ratio conditional on working at least one hour. The extensive elasticity is defined as the relative
change of the employment rate Egc: ε
S,ext
gc =
∂Egc
∂w
w
Egc
. This corresponds to the extensive margin
(participation) in the result tables of Bargain et al. (2014).
Looking first at single females in Table 2, we see that the labor supply elasticity of low skilled
single females ranges from 0.1 in the Eastern European countries to just over 0.3 in the British Isles.
In the medium skilled category, it is the Southern European countries which display the highest
labor supply elasticity for single females (at around 0.3) while the same figure for the British Isles is
almost unchanged compared to the low skilled category. The Nordic and Continental countries show a
similarly low labor supply elasticity for this group of medium skilled single women. The labor supply
elasticities of high skilled single women are much higher than those of low or medium skilled, ranging
from 0.25 in Eastern Europe to 0.5 in the Southern European countries and in the UK and Ireland.
In general, women in couples display higher labor supply elasticities than their single counter-
parts (except for the high skilled category). Once again, there are discrepancies by country groups
although the labor supply elasticity of women in couples displays less variability by skill group than
that of single women. Eastern European women in couples have the lowest labor supply elasticity,
regardless of skill type, at around 0.1. Non-single southern European women have the largest labor
supply elasticities which range from 0.35 among the high skilled to 0.5 among the medium skilled.
The labor supply elasticity of continental European women is fairly constant across skill groups at
around 0.3 while the Nordic countries and the British Isles also have stable elasticities of around 0.2
across skill groups.
Among single men, the highest labor supply elasticities are to be found among the high and
low skilled with the group of medium skilled single men displaying reasonably stable labor supply
elasticities across countries of between 0.1 (in the Continental countries) and 0.2 (in the Nordic
countries). Among the low-skilled single men, the British Isles have the largest labor supply elasticity
of around 0.45. The smallest, of 0.15, are to be found in the Continental and Eastern European
countries. Meanwhile the Nordic and Southern European low skilled single men have labor supply
elasticities of around 0.25. Similar cross-country grouping patterns are found for the high-skilled with
the highest elasticities found in the British Isles (0.65), followed by the Nordic (0.35) and Southern
European (0.3) countries.
Finally, we observe very low labor supply elasticities for men in couples, regardless of their skill
level. These range from 0.06 to 0.14 with the largest values observed for high skilled men, followed by
low skilled and then medium skilled men. The Nordic countries display the largest elasticities across
country groups for men in couples, regardless of the skill group.
21
Table 2: Supply and Demand Elasticities
Skill Level
High Medium Low
(Total) Labor supply elasticities
Single Male
Continental 0.15 0.11 0.23
Nordic 0.27 0.21 0.34
Anglo-Saxon 0.46 0.14 0.65
Southern 0.27 0.18 0.27
Eastern 0.15 0.17 0.24
Single Female
Continental 0.23 0.14 0.38
Nordic 0.19 0.11 0.36
Anglo-Saxon 0.32 0.20 0.51
Southern 0.26 0.29 0.48
Eastern 0.09 0.10 0.48
Married Male
Continental 0.09 0.08 0.10
Nordic 0.11 0.09 0.14
Anglo-Saxon 0.09 0.06 0.11
Southern 0.06 0.08 0.07
Eastern 0.08 0.08 0.08
Married Female
Continental 0.28 0.30 0.27
Nordic 0.18 0.17 0.22
Anglo-Saxon 0.20 0.23 0.19
Southern 0.40 0.49 0.36
Eastern 0.11 0.12 0.11
Labor demand elasticities
Continental -0.53 -0.62
Nordic -0.48 -0.54
Anglo-Saxon -0.66 -0.91
Southern -0.58
Eastern -0.66
Note: Supply elasticities based on estimations from Bargain et al. (2014). The values refer to mean value
by country group. Where possible, elasticities are country-specific. If a specific country was not covered in
the initial study, it was assigned the mean value within the country group. Demand elasticities are from
Lichter et al. (2015), by adding an interaction between skill and country group to the main specification
and setting the time trend to 2030. Due to insufficient empirical estimates, we had to partly aggregate skill
levels for the demand side.
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Analytical derivation of new labor market equilibrium
Denoting total hours worked with H and the average wage w, the labor demand elasticity η with
respect to wage is defined by η = ∂H∂w
w
H = H
′(w) wH . We assume an iso-elastic demand curve of the
form HD(w) = cw
η, where c is derived from the observed combination of hours and (average) wages.
HD(w) = c
LD
0 w
η =
H0
wη0
wη. (3)
Assuming an equilibrium state initially, both the supply and the demand curve go through this
point. Defining the wage elasticity of labor supply ε analogously26, the analytical labor supply curve
looks as
HS(w) = c
LS
0 w
ε =
H0
wε0
wε (4)
Now suppose a labor supply shock due to demographic change, i. e. HS1 = λH0. This shifts the labor
supply curve (4) by manipulating c0, i. e. c1 = λ
H0
wε0
.
At the same time, we mimic general equilibrium effects from demographic change on the labor
demand side by scaling cLD0 in Eq. 3 in proportion to the population change pi. The new labor market
equilibrium is found at the intersection of both equations
piH0
wη0
wη︸ ︷︷ ︸
new LD curve
!
=
λH0
wε0
wε︸ ︷︷ ︸
new LS curve
(5)
This yields the new equilibrium wage
w∗ =
(
λ
pi
) 1
η−ε
w0 (6)
The relative wage effect w
∗
w0
=
(
λ
pi
) 1
η−ε for the respective population subgroup can then be fed into the
tax-benefit calculator to compute labor market reactions on the individual level, and, finally, fiscal
effects. Note that measurement error in the individual wage does not constitute a problem here, as
w∗
w0
is independent of w0. We distinguish individual reactions by extensive and intensive labor supply
elasticities. First, people in work adjust their number of hours according to the intensive elasticity.
In a next step, the number of people in work is adjusted such that the employment rate changes
according to the extensive elasticity.
26 At this stage, the total labor supply elasticities are used.
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Table 3: Projected Total Population in 2010 and 2030
Million People % Change
Base tough friendly tough friendly
AT 8.4 8.3 9.1 -1.2 8.7
BE 10.8 11.7 12.5 8.1 15.1
BG 7.6 5.8 7.2 -22.9 -4.5
CY 0.8 0.9 1.0 10.4 23.9
CZ 10.5 10.1 11.2 -3.8 6.5
DE 81.8 72.3 80.8 -11.6 -1.2
DK 5.5 5.7 6.0 2.5 7.9
EE 1.3 1.1 1.4 -15.4 5.9
EL 11.3 10.9 11.8 -4.0 4.4
ES 46.0 44.8 52.0 -2.6 13.0
FI 5.4 5.5 5.8 2.6 7.6
FR 62.8 66.2 69.5 5.4 10.6
HU 10.0 9.2 9.7 -8.3 -2.7
IE 4.5 4.7 5.3 4.2 18.0
IT 60.3 60.6 67.6 0.5 12.1
LT 3.3 2.8 3.1 -15.2 -5.9
LU 0.5 0.6 0.7 21.4 30.4
LV 2.2 1.8 2.1 -21.4 -5.1
MT 0.4 0.4 0.4 -9.5 4.6
NL 16.6 17.0 18.1 2.6 9.0
PL 38.2 34.8 38.3 -8.8 0.3
PT 10.6 10.0 11.1 -5.8 4.0
RO 21.5 18.0 21.9 -16.0 2.0
SE 9.3 10.3 11.0 10.6 17.5
SI 2.0 2.1 2.3 0.6 10.8
SK 5.4 5.3 5.7 -3.2 5.2
UK 62.0 67.5 70.8 8.8 14.2
Mean -2.7 7.9
Population-weighted mean -2.3 7.4
Note: Own calculations based on projections in Huisman et al. (2013) applied to
EU-SILC data for the EU-27.
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Table 4: Projected Labor Force in 2010 and 2030
Million Workers % Change
Base tough friendly tough friendly
AT 5.7 5.2 5.6 -7.7 -0.9
BE 7.1 7.3 7.6 1.5 6.3
BG 5.2 3.7 4.6 -28.6 -12.3
CY 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 12.4
CZ 7.4 6.6 7.2 -10.9 -3.5
DE 53.9 43.8 47.9 -18.7 -11.1
DK 3.6 3.5 3.6 -3.3 -0.1
EE 0.9 0.7 0.9 -22.3 -2.2
EL 7.5 7.0 7.4 -7.6 -2.0
ES 31.4 28.9 33.2 -8.0 5.8
FI 3.6 3.3 3.4 -7.6 -5.2
FR 40.7 39.6 40.9 -2.7 0.5
HU 6.9 6.1 6.2 -10.9 -9.1
IE 3.0 2.9 3.4 -3.2 11.5
IT 39.7 38.0 41.5 -4.1 4.8
LT 2.3 1.8 2.0 -21.2 -14.4
LU 0.3 0.4 0.4 16.3 22.7
LV 1.5 1.2 1.4 -25.5 -12.6
MT 0.3 0.2 0.3 -19.6 -8.0
NL 11.1 10.4 10.8 -6.8 -2.8
PL 27.2 22.9 24.5 -16.0 -10.2
PT 7.1 6.5 7.0 -8.3 -1.9
RO 15.0 12.1 14.6 -19.3 -2.8
SE 6.1 6.3 6.6 3.4 8.2
SI 1.4 1.3 1.4 -8.6 -1.0
SK 3.9 3.5 3.7 -10.3 -5.1
UK 41.0 41.7 43.2 1.8 5.5
Mean -9.2 -1.0
Population-weighted mean -8.7 -1.4
Note: Own calculations based on Huisman et al. (2013) applied to EU-SILC data for
the EU-27. Labor force is defined by the population aged between 15 and 64.
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Table 5: Assumed Annual Net Migration Flows in 2030
Country last observed net flow projected net flows
tough friendly
in 1000
AT 21.1 12.9 58.4
BE 64.1 23.3 62.0
BG -15.7 -57.4 50.8
CY 1.8 1.8 9.2
CZ 28.3 -5.6 56.7
DE -10.7 -100.3 366.2
DK 15.3 5.9 18.0
EE 0.0 -11.8 11.2
EL 35.1 11.2 60.3
ES 50.3 -5.8 513.8
FI 14.6 5.6 13.9
FR 70.0 5.0 169.0
IE -27.6 -3.9 45.4
IT 311.6 128.2 549.1
HU 17.3 18.4 25.9
LT -15.5 -9.5 7.4
LV -4.7 -12.6 13.5
LU 6.6 2.1 4.7
MT -0.2 -1.7 2.4
NL 38.5 -13.4 37.0
PL -1.2 -85.3 91.7
PT 15.4 10.1 64.4
RO -1.6 -144.2 150.6
SE 62.6 9.0 43.0
SI 11.5 -0.6 11.9
SK 4.4 -2.6 18.9
UK 201.3 100.8 255.5
EU-27 892.6 -120.4 2710.9
Source: Table 4 in Huisman et al. (2013).
26
T
a
b
le
6
:
O
v
er
v
ie
w
:
P
en
si
o
n
S
y
st
em
s
in
th
e
E
U
C
o
u
n
tr
y
P
u
b
li
c
P
en
si
o
n
S
y
st
em
O
cc
u
p
.
P
en
si
o
n
S
y
st
em
P
ri
va
te
P
en
si
o
n
S
y
st
em
S
ta
tu
to
ry
R
et
ir
em
en
t
A
g
e
(2
0
1
0
)
re
ce
n
t
R
A
re
fo
rm
s
S
h
a
re
w
o
rk
-
er
s/
p
en
si
o
n
er
s
F
er
ti
li
ty
R
a
te
M
en
W
o
m
en
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
2
A
T
E
R
M
6
5
6
0
R
A
+
5
(w
)
3
.7
7
1
.4
4
B
E
E
R
V
6
5
6
5
3
.7
6
1
.7
9
B
G
E
R
V
M
(*
a
ft
er
1
9
5
9
&
S
P
)
6
3
6
0
R
A
+
2
(m
);
R
A
+
3
(w
)
3
.6
0
1
.5
0
C
Y
E
R
M
(P
u
b
l)
;
V
(P
ri
v
)
6
5
6
5
5
.2
2
1
.3
9
C
Z
E
R
6
2
y
2
m
5
8
y
8
m
R
A
+
:2
m
/
b
ir
th
co
h
.(
m
/
w
)
4
.1
7
1
.4
5
D
E
E
R
V
6
5
6
5
R
A
+
2
(m
/
w
)
3
.1
4
1
.3
8
D
K
F
R
a
n
d
M
T
S
Q
M
6
5
6
5
R
A
+
2
(m
/
w
)
3
.6
8
1
.7
3
E
E
E
R
si
n
ce
1
9
9
9
M
(*
a
ft
er
1
9
8
2
)
6
3
6
1
R
A
+
2
(m
);
R
A
+
4
(w
)
3
.7
4
1
.5
6
E
L
E
R
6
5
6
0
R
A
+
2
(m
);
R
A
+
7
(w
)
3
.2
9
1
.3
4
E
S
E
R
(P
ri
v
);
F
R
w
(P
u
b
l)
M
(P
u
b
l)
;V
(P
ri
v
)
6
5
6
5
R
A
+
2
(m
/
w
)
3
.8
3
1
.3
2
F
I
E
R
V
6
3
6
3
3
.5
3
1
.8
0
F
R
E
R
V
6
5
6
5
R
A
+
2
(m
/
w
)
3
.6
5
2
.0
1
H
U
E
R
V
6
2
6
2
R
A
+
3
(m
/
w
)
4
.0
2
1
.3
4
IE
F
R
M
(P
u
b
l)
;
V
(P
ri
v
)
6
6
6
6
R
A
+
2
(m
/
w
)
5
.5
4
2
.0
1
IT
E
R
V
6
5
y
4
m
6
0
y
4
0
R
A
+
1
y
8
m
(m
);
R
A
+
6
y
8
m
(w
)
3
.0
9
1
.4
3
L
V
E
R
6
2
6
2
3
.6
2
1
.4
4
L
T
E
R
6
2
y
6
m
6
0
R
A
+
1
.5
(m
);
R
A
+
3
(w
)
3
.7
2
1
.6
0
L
U
E
R
V
6
5
6
5
4
.9
4
1
.5
7
N
L
F
R
M
6
5
6
5
R
A
+
2
(m
/
w
)
4
.0
1
1
.7
2
P
L
E
R
V
M
(*
a
ft
er
1
9
6
9
);
V
6
5
6
0
R
A
+
2
(m
);
R
A
+
7
(w
)
5
.0
6
1
.3
0
P
T
E
R
m
o
st
ly
V
6
5
6
5
3
.4
3
1
.2
8
R
O
E
R
M
6
4
5
9
R
A
+
1
(m
);
R
A
+
2
(w
)
4
.2
2
1
.5
3
S
E
E
R
Q
M
M
6
1
6
1
3
.3
9
1
.9
1
S
I
E
R
m
o
st
ly
V
6
3
6
1
4
.0
5
1
.5
8
S
K
E
R
M
;
V
fo
r
N
L
M
E
6
2
5
7
y
1
1
m
R
A
+
4
.1
(w
)
5
.5
3
1
.3
4
U
K
E
R
(V
)
V
6
5
6
0
R
A
+
3
(m
);
R
A
+
8
(w
)
3
.8
4
1
.9
2
S
o
u
rc
e
:
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
(2
0
1
2
),
O
E
C
D
(2
0
1
3
);
W
it
h
re
g
a
rd
to
th
e
p
ri
v
a
te
p
en
si
o
n
,
a
v
o
lu
n
ta
ry
sc
h
em
e
ex
is
ts
in
a
ll
co
u
n
tr
ie
s.
R
A
+
=
In
cr
ea
se
R
et
ir
em
en
t
a
g
e
b
y
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
g
iv
en
y
ea
rs
fo
r
w
o
m
en
(w
)
a
n
d
/
o
r
m
en
(m
);
n
o
en
tr
y
:
d
o
es
n
o
t
ex
is
t;
E
R
=
ea
rn
in
g
s-
re
la
te
d
;
F
R
=
fl
a
t
ra
te
;
F
R
w
=
fl
a
t
ra
te
b
y
w
a
g
e
ca
te
g
o
ri
es
;
M
T
S
=
m
ea
n
s
te
st
ed
su
p
p
le
m
en
t;
S
=
S
u
p
p
le
m
en
t;
P
ri
v
=
P
ri
v
a
te
S
ec
to
r
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
s;
P
u
b
l
=
P
u
b
li
c
S
ec
to
r
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
s;
V
=
V
o
lu
n
ta
ry
P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
;
M
=
M
a
n
d
a
to
ry
P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
;
Q
M
=
Q
u
a
si
-m
a
n
d
a
to
ry
;
S
P
=
se
le
ct
ed
p
ro
fe
ss
io
n
s;
N
L
M
E
=
n
ew
la
b
o
r
m
a
rk
et
en
tr
a
n
ts
.
27
Table 7: Hours Worked in 2010 and 2030
Base D DW DRW
to fr to fr to fr
Mill. Hours per week % change
AT 148.0 -11.1 -3.1 -9.4 0.1 2.4 14.1
BE 177.9 4.7 11.8 3.5 11.3 24.0 32.4
BG 179.0 -27.4 -8.6 -30.7 -12.1 -17.4 2.1
CY 17.0 2.5 16.7 2.5 16.6 18.7 34.0
CZ 221.4 -8.6 1.0 -8.9 1.8 3.2 14.3
DE 1442.5 -20.3 -10.1 -19.8 -9.4 -7.4 4.8
DK 109.4 -0.3 3.9 0.1 5.2 5.4 10.8
EE 29.8 -20.9 2.3 -23.1 -0.6 -12.4 11.7
EL 218.1 -9.0 -2.9 -10.0 -3.2 4.8 11.6
ES 910.5 -6.2 9.5 -8.0 7.7 10.5 27.7
FI 110.2 -4.4 -0.3 -5.9 -1.0 3.9 8.8
FR 1080.2 -0.2 4.5 -2.6 2.6 18.5 25.0
HU 188.5 -8.2 -5.0 -14.0 -9.9 -1.6 2.9
IE 82.1 2.0 19.0 -0.4 15.2 11.9 28.3
IT 1169.6 1.1 10.3 -5.0 4.6 16.6 27.1
LT 69.6 -17.6 -7.5 -19.6 -9.1 -1.3 9.8
LU 9.5 17.3 24.7 17.4 26.1 48.9 56.9
LV 51.6 -22.6 -6.5 -25.6 -9.9 -17.4 -0.7
MT 6.7 -12.5 2.1 -13.7 1.6 -7.7 8.0
NL 270.6 -4.6 0.9 -4.1 2.2 4.0 10.9
PL 745.3 -11.1 -3.2 -12.3 -3.9 -1.3 7.8
PT 206.5 -4.4 0.5 -7.1 -1.7 8.2 15.1
RO 376.3 -22.3 -0.5 -22.2 -1.3 -5.9 17.8
SE 177.9 7.0 13.7 4.3 11.8 11.6 18.8
SI 40.3 -8.8 -0.0 -10.4 -1.2 6.8 17.0
SK 119.5 -7.3 -0.8 -8.1 -0.8 7.5 14.7
UK 1033.9 3.1 8.6 3.1 9.1 14.3 20.3
Mean -7.0 3.0 -8.5 1.9 5.5 16.7
Notes: Own calculations based on Euromod input datasets reweighted for 2010
and 2030 and labor demand and labor supply elasticities. Hours refer to total hours
worked per week. D=demographic change only. W indicates scenarios with wage
effect.
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Table 8: Employment in 2010 and 2030
Base D DW DRW
to fr to fr to fr
Millions % change
AT 3.6 -11.3 -3.7 -9.9 -0.5 4.8 17.7
BE 4.5 3.8 10.1 4.8 12.8 29.2 37.7
BG 3.9 -27.5 -8.6 -30.1 -10.9 -14.6 5.0
CY 0.4 1.7 15.7 5.0 19.6 27.8 44.5
CZ 4.7 -8.5 0.9 -3.8 7.4 12.7 24.7
DE 35.2 -20.2 -10.9 -18.0 -7.4 -3.0 13.3
DK 3.0 0.3 4.7 0.9 5.8 11.3 17.1
EE 0.7 -20.9 1.7 -21.7 1.1 -8.1 16.8
EL 4.7 -8.9 -2.5 -6.8 0.8 11.5 18.1
ES 21.5 -6.3 9.5 -5.4 11.7 18.2 36.6
FI 2.7 -4.5 -0.6 -4.7 0.0 9.2 14.3
FR 27.5 -1.3 2.9 -1.8 3.1 22.5 28.8
HU 4.5 -9.1 -6.3 -12.9 -9.0 2.1 6.6
IE 2.1 1.8 18.8 0.8 17.7 18.1 35.9
IT 26.8 0.2 9.4 -2.5 7.7 20.5 30.7
LT 1.7 -17.7 -7.9 -19.0 -8.4 -0.6 11.0
LU 0.2 15.2 21.6 20.3 28.7 48.7 57.6
LV 1.2 -22.1 -6.9 -23.5 -7.7 -12.6 4.4
MT 0.2 -13.8 0.1 -13.8 1.9 -5.9 9.4
NL 7.8 -5.0 0.2 -4.5 1.9 8.4 16.1
PL 16.2 -10.6 -2.4 -8.9 -0.1 5.1 14.9
PT 4.9 -6.0 -0.3 -5.6 -0.6 12.9 19.7
RO 8.5 -22.1 0.3 -19.7 3.0 -0.4 25.8
SE 5.3 6.8 13.2 3.7 10.9 13.0 20.1
SI 0.9 -9.7 -1.1 -9.5 -0.3 7.6 18.2
SK 2.7 -7.5 -0.7 -8.3 1.7 8.7 16.2
UK 28.7 3.5 8.9 4.5 10.6 22.3 28.8
Mean -7.4 2.5 -7.0 3.8 10.0 21.9
Notes: Employment is defined by working a positive amount of hours. Own
calculations based on Euromod input datasets reweighted for 2010 and 2030
and labor demand and labor supply elasticities. Notes: Hours refer to total
hours worked per week. D=demographic change only. W indicates scenarios
with wage effect.
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Table 9: Tax Revenues in 2010 and 2030
Base D DW DRW
to fr to fr to fr
bn. e per
year
% change
AT 21.6 11.6 26.1 30.8 53.9 1.6 29.2
BE 37.0 15.3 24.6 26.0 40.9 -3.1 9.1
BG 1.2 -24.1 -0.9 -23.0 0.7 -21.7 3.1
CY 1.0 28.3 47.0 39.9 81.8 30.8 76.1
CZ 4.4 -3.7 11.1 5.8 34.8 -17.7 4.3
DE 221.0 -16.3 -2.4 8.4 12.4 -20.6 -15.4
DK 45.7 6.8 13.4 16.0 37.5 2.6 17.2
EE 1.0 -18.9 8.4 -9.7 14.7 -20.8 3.6
EL 11.8 18.0 32.6 19.2 31.4 9.8 22.6
ES 65.0 23.5 44.8 31.2 57.6 1.7 21.9
FI 29.6 11.9 20.0 25.7 46.2 8.2 24.0
FR 129.0 21.5 29.8 28.9 46.3 6.9 19.6
HU 3.7 -3.8 8.2 -13.7 -2.9 -25.2 -17.0
IE 10.9 29.2 45.7 40.6 45.2 17.8 24.1
IT 218.2 25.0 38.8 30.7 45.9 23.4 35.3
LT 1.5 -12.3 1.2 -6.4 7.6 -20.1 -6.6
LU 2.2 32.1 45.6 41.9 64.1 15.8 32.1
LV 2.1 -19.4 1.7 -20.2 2.4 -23.8 -0.2
MT 0.2 2.0 25.4 -11.9 20.3 -16.4 9.4
NL 58.9 9.9 18.1 31.7 48.5 12.4 25.0
PL 28.4 8.4 22.4 8.1 26.9 2.7 20.6
PT 10.1 33.5 45.8 21.3 38.0 -16.5 -4.4
RO 6.2 -5.8 23.5 -4.0 11.2 -16.2 -0.1
SE 47.0 15.9 24.7 24.3 53.8 17.3 40.5
SI 2.3 5.2 19.6 42.6 39.9 23.5 24.4
SK 1.2 -1.0 12.0 2.4 33.7 -21.2 7.0
UK 243.4 13.5 20.7 20.5 29.0 14.9 21.8
Notes: Own calculations based on Euromod input datasets reweighted for
2010 and 2030 and labor demand and labor supply elasticities. Taxes in-
clude taxes on personal income, capital income and property. D=demographic
change only. W indicates scenarios with wage effect.
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Table 10: SSC Revenues in 2010 and 2030
Base D DW DRW
to fr to fr to fr
bn. e per
year
% change
AT 42.9 -5.1 6.2 4.4 16.2 5.4 19.7
BE 47.2 7.1 15.0 16.0 28.2 4.7 15.0
BG 3.6 -26.3 -3.2 -24.2 -1.3 -21.2 3.6
CY 1.5 5.4 21.4 12.1 26.1 19.9 41.3
CZ 20.6 -6.6 5.9 -1.4 17.9 -5.7 11.1
DE 357.7 -19.6 -8.1 -10.0 -0.1 -9.7 -0.5
DK 11.3 2.6 7.9 9.1 23.9 1.4 12.2
EE 2.3 -20.0 6.5 -12.4 12.0 -18.9 5.9
EL 23.9 -2.1 7.0 -0.2 7.7 13.3 23.2
ES 140.0 -2.4 16.4 4.7 25.1 2.9 22.7
FI 25.5 -1.6 4.2 9.1 23.9 1.6 13.4
FR 357.2 4.2 10.2 12.2 24.6 8.3 18.4
HU 9.2 -8.0 0.8 -13.1 -3.7 -12.4 -4.0
IE 14.1 10.6 27.6 18.2 26.9 3.9 13.0
IT 239.0 3.2 14.9 8.9 22.4 18.5 30.7
LT 4.4 -13.6 -1.0 -9.0 4.2 -16.8 -3.6
LU 3.1 20.6 31.3 29.1 45.1 28.3 40.5
LV 3.1 -22.1 -1.4 -23.0 -0.8 -25.1 -1.9
MT 0.4 -9.2 7.3 -11.6 3.6 -5.0 11.4
NL 99.1 2.9 10.0 7.8 14.8 5.8 12.9
PL 41.6 -4.9 7.6 -4.0 12.3 -0.5 16.1
PT 21.5 5.6 14.9 4.3 17.2 -5.7 6.5
RO 9.6 -15.1 14.1 -13.3 1.4 -17.1 -0.0
SE 54.8 10.4 17.7 15.6 30.5 15.8 28.6
SI 6.2 -2.6 9.7 18.2 23.4 14.2 21.5
SK 8.9 -8.2 1.5 -7.2 7.9 -10.0 4.2
UK 151.3 5.7 12.6 16.6 23.9 8.0 13.9
Notes: Own calculations based on Euromod input datasets reweighted for
2010 and 2030 and labor demand and labor supply elasticities. Social security
contributions from employees, employers, self-employed and pensioners are
captured. D=demographic change only. W indicates scenarios with wage
effect.
31
Table 11: Benefit Payments in 2010 and 2030
Base D DW DRW
to fr to fr to fr
bn. eper year % change
AT 40.1 29.5 43.1 29.3 42.8 12.6 24.9
BE 33.1 41.9 54.7 41.8 54.7 -3.7 6.1
BG 3.3 0.5 20.1 0.6 20.3 -24.4 -15.3
CY 1.8 42.7 57.1 42.3 56.7 -10.0 0.6
CZ 13.9 13.5 26.5 13.4 26.5 -9.8 2.0
DE 370.1 8.3 20.2 8.7 20.5 -10.9 -0.3
DK 30.5 11.5 21.0 11.1 20.5 -8.0 -0.4
EE 1.0 2.7 20.8 2.8 21.0 -19.2 -4.6
EL 20.3 29.5 44.6 29.2 44.3 -4.3 8.9
ES 70.2 49.8 67.3 49.3 66.7 -1.3 10.8
FI 23.7 33.2 44.5 33.0 44.0 7.5 17.0
FR 263.0 35.3 45.8 34.9 45.7 1.7 10.1
HU 9.1 10.8 20.5 11.2 20.7 -2.6 6.8
IE 17.7 13.8 27.0 13.9 27.2 2.0 14.3
IT 200.6 41.7 56.6 41.4 56.1 5.7 17.6
LT 2.3 2.4 14.8 2.7 15.4 -20.2 -10.1
LU 3.0 43.7 55.9 42.4 54.2 9.7 19.4
LV 1.2 -3.2 14.7 -2.8 14.7 -19.6 -4.0
MT 0.6 19.6 35.8 19.4 35.7 12.5 27.0
NL 47.1 23.9 34.2 22.7 33.0 13.0 21.6
PL 38.1 24.8 38.2 24.6 37.8 5.0 16.1
PT 18.2 36.8 51.2 36.3 50.2 -11.1 -1.0
RO 11.6 21.1 39.6 20.8 39.2 -0.5 14.9
SE 35.4 24.0 36.0 23.9 36.0 -2.3 7.2
SI 4.1 35.6 49.1 34.4 47.8 4.7 15.8
SK 5.0 25.3 37.2 25.5 37.8 -4.2 10.0
UK 175.7 16.2 23.9 13.6 20.8 0.9 7.4
Notes: Own calculations based on Euromod input datasets reweighted for
2010 and 2030 and labor demand and labor supply elasticities. Benefits in-
cludes pensions (old-age, widower, orphan, disability pensions) and other so-
cial transfers including benefits for children, housing, education, unemploy-
ment, maternity as well as tax credits. D=demographic change only. W
indicates scenarios with wage effect.
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Table 12: Other Public Expenditures in 2010 and 2030
Base 2030
tough friendly
bn. eper year % change
AT 35.6 2.0 13.0
BE 43.7 11.9 20.6
BG 3.3 -18.2 0.7
CY 1.9 15.1 27.5
CZ 14.3 4.0 15.3
DE 290.2 -7.3 4.2
DK 35.7 6.1 13.2
EE 1.4 -9.0 11.1
EL 21.0 0.9 11.2
ES 114.8 5.2 21.2
FI 22.4 10.4 17.4
FR 267.7 9.0 14.8
HU 8.2 -8.9 -0.7
IE 19.4 18.0 28.8
IT 175.0 2.3 15.5
LT 2.8 -11.5 -1.8
LU 3.8 23.8 33.7
LV 1.9 -20.1 -2.4
MT 0.7 -5.6 9.1
NL 90.6 9.9 18.3
PL 27.9 -6.7 3.7
PT 19.3 -6.5 5.7
RO 12.2 -13.0 4.8
SE 46.1 17.2 26.1
SI 3.9 8.0 19.4
SK 5.9 2.7 12.4
UK 221.5 14.6 21.1
Notes: Imputed values based on per capita expenditures by country and age
group from Eurostat (2013). Expenditures include health care, old-age care, child
care and education. Expenditures are assumed irresponsive to changes in wages
or employment and are hence fix across all scenarios. In lack of country values
for RO, BG, CY, MT, LV and LT, the age-specific amount is imputed by the
age-specific mean from the other countries in the respective country group.
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Table 13: Changes in Normalized Budgets between 2010 and 2030
D DW DRW
to fr to fr to fr
AT -9.82% -10.96% -3.15% -2.58% -2.47% 0.11%
BE -7.30% -7.94% -1.38% 0.99% -2.11% -0.39%
BG -3.92% -4.92% -3.43% -4.43% 2.33% 3.92%
CY -6.30% -6.98% -4.32% -3.25% 4.38% 7.35%
CZ -6.93% -7.25% -4.29% -1.09% -2.05% 0.01%
DE -10.06% -10.55% -2.46% -5.32% -1.61% -4.09%
DK -2.03% -3.61% 2.47% 7.84% 1.42% 4.11%
EE -8.38% -1.94% -4.32% 0.94% -5.05% 0.90%
EL -4.89% -6.32% -4.20% -6.23% 5.39% 4.38%
ES -6.40% -4.31% -3.04% 0.33% 0.03% 3.13%
FI -7.93% -8.36% -0.23% 6.07% -1.41% 2.91%
FR -8.87% -10.18% -4.18% -1.45% 1.20% 2.96%
HU -4.21% -5.26% -7.47% -8.41% -4.19% -5.81%
IE -1.83% -2.19% 1.54% -2.48% -1.97% -5.34%
IT -3.17% -2.55% 0.14% 1.76% 9.95% 10.97%
LT -4.34% -2.69% -1.90% -0.06% -2.14% 0.23%
LU -6.61% -7.53% -2.77% -0.91% 0.18% 0.64%
LV -7.65% -1.47% -8.20% -1.13% -7.62% 0.33%
MT -4.40% -7.89% -5.66% -8.76% -3.36% -6.30%
NL -4.45% -4.64% 2.58% 4.30% -0.78% 0.31%
PL -4.74% -3.98% -4.49% -1.75% 0.35% 3.49%
PT -1.10% -3.29% -2.92% -3.43% 0.48% 0.05%
RO -7.49% -6.60% -6.58% -12.02% -2.82% -6.48%
SE -2.18% -2.32% 2.38% 11.54% 6.48% 13.43%
SI -10.63% -10.11% 2.17% -2.12% 5.31% 2.82%
SK -9.57% -10.27% -9.04% -6.77% -4.79% -3.48%
UK -1.99% -1.99% 1.94% 2.43% 1.50% 1.48%
Mean -5.82% -5.78% -2.62% -1.33% -0.13% 1.17%
Notes: Balance change to 2010 according to Equation 2. Own calculations
based on Euromod input datasets reweighted for 2010 and 2030 and labor
demand and labor supply elasticities. D=demographic change only; 2. W
indicates scenarios with wage effect.
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